Vasubandu's Abdhidharmakosa (Duerlinger): Buddhist Philosophy, Essential Readings, Ch 25
Subject:
Duerlinger gives us a short introduction to his article, consisting of a summary of Vasubandhu's argument in Chapter 9 of his tome-like Abhidharmakosa. Essentially, Duerlinger offers translation of two short passages of Vasubhandu's refutation of the Pudgalavadin's theory of self.
The Refutation was composed in the 4th/5th CE and primarily consists of the argument that persons do not exist in the sense that they do not possess and essence, or svabhava. In other words, persons do not possess person-properties or exist apart from being conceived in "dependence upon the causal continuum of the elements of their bodies and minds."
A more sustained look at Vasubandhu's refutation is provided in Duerlinger's volume (which will be the subject of a subsequent post.)
Primary Argument:
[This section consists of Vasubandhu, not Duerlinger's, argument.] Vasubandhu believes that the Pudgalavadin's theory of the self is incoherent and contradicts the teachings of the Buddha. First, pudgala means person, and serves as a conventional designation for "self." To the Pudgalavadins, the term pudgala obviates the svabhava-problem of self. There is no essence to persons, they argue, but only a pudgala which is an existent that depends on the aggregates, but is neither identical to nor different from the aggregates.
Vasubandhu finds this argument untenable for a number of reasons - some of which are quite convoluted and difficult to understand (and I don't want to understand them...). Controversially, the "Refutation" is based on premises that the Pudgalavadins would not likely hold. Primarily, he assumes that we exist (according to his own standards of existence), and therefore we must be either other than our aggregates or the same as them. The middle ground that the Pudgalavadins offer is not acceptable to Vasubandhu. The entire debate turns on a phrase (I don't know the Sanskrit) translated by Duerlinger, where the Pudgalavadins argue that a person is conceived "in reliance upon" the aggregates, rather than being the same as or different from, in the way that fire is conceived in reliance upon fuel.
Vasubandhu likens this argument to that of the Thirtikas-proponents of non-Buddhist philosophy at that time-who assert the existence of a substantial Self.
Method:
Duerlinger provides a translation of the Refutation which, I know from another source, comes from a Sanskrit translation of the treatise, originally discovered in Tibet in 1936, but is also available in Tibetan and Chinese (two separate translations).
Key Points/Free Write:
I think the key point to take away is that Chapter 9 of Vasubandhu's massive Abhidharmakosa is devoted to refuting certain theories of persons coming from both Buddhists (such as the Pudgalavadins) and non-Buddhist Indian philosophical schools (Thirtikas), and that his primary argument against the Pudgalavadins is that they try to say that the pudgala can be something neither the same as NOR different from the aggregates, something that Vasubandhu finds is untenable. This is all that interests me in terms of content.
In terms of how this chapter would relate to my project on self in psychotherapy, I think that the debate had by Vasubandhu and the Pudgalavadins may have some resonance today in considering my dissertation. How is it that the MBSR has become taken in by the 'self-help' crowd in America, despite the fact that mindfulness is 'based-on' so called traditional Buddhist teachings, such as those offered by Vasubandhu? Would the Pudgalavadin's ideas about person make more sense in today's MBSR community, namely, that there is some form of self that is related to the aggregates that is present enough to allow us to pursue self-help type activities?
Perhaps, on the other hand, the type of debate layed out by Vasubandhu doesn't map at all on to things I am thinking about in terms of self and mindfulness in psychotheraputic circles today...
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