Therevadan Philosophy of Mind and the Person (Harvey) Buddhist Philosophy, Essential Readings: Ch 23

Ch 23:Therevadan Philosophy of Mind and the Person (Harvey)
Subject Matter:
This chapter presents translations of three classic discourses on the Self, two of which are in the Therevadan Pali canon and one which is a postcanonical text.  They are the Anatta-lakkhanma Sutta, the Mahanidana Sutta and Milindapanha's Questions.
Harvey also gives a brief introduction to the "religio-philosophical context" of the Buddha.  This amounts to the argument that, in the time of the Buddha, there existed three 'camps' with regard to conceptions of personhood: "eternalists," "annihilationishts," and "eel-wrigglers."  The Buddha did not subscribe to any of these views, rather arguing that both mind and body are bundles of "changing, conditioned, and interacting processes."
The Anatta-lakkhan a Sutta is said to be the second sutta the Buddha gave and argues that each of the five aggregates cannot be said to be Self.  Why? First, one cannot control them.  Second, the aggregates are impermanent.
The Mahanidana Sutta (Great Discourse on Causal Links) considers three ways in which one can relate Self to "feeling." The sutta consists of refutations of the following three positions: 1) Self is identical to feeling 2) Self is not feeling and 3) Self feels (but is not feeling).  The first cannot be true because feelings come and go as they please, unlike the Self.  If happiness goes away, surely would the Self proposition #1 were true. Nor can the second be true because if Self was not feeling, how could one say, "I am?"  Finally, if the Self merely feels, then feelings would have to cease (and this is not possible).
Finally, in King Milinda's Questions, the author utilizes the famous chariot argument to refute the existence of a single, permanent, unchanging self.  "Just as, without an assemblage of parts,The word 'chariot' is used, So when the aggregates exist, There is the convention 'a being.'"
Primary Arguments:
Harvey does not make arguments, per se, but rather presents arguments by various figures from traditional Buddhist discourses.  Among them, two involve the historical Buddha in a fashion consistent with other suttas, and the other concerning a 1st CE conversation between the Bactrian-Greek King Milinda and Nagasena.  It seems like the authors of these texts (the Buddha?) employed classical Indian logic (?) to refute the existence of Self.  It seems like the broader argument is an epistemological one, where one cannot know universals (not just the Self).  These texts predate the Dharmakirti arguments against universals but seem to have some similarities and may serve as precursors of sorts.
'Method:
The bulk of the chapter is devoted to Harvey's translations (and reconstruction of philisophico-religious context at the time of the Buddha) of three Therevadan discourses on self.
Key Points:
These are three important discourses that someone studying Buddhist conceptions of Self should be familiar with and able to cite as instances of canonical (and post-canonical) refutations of Self in the Therevadan tradition.
It would also be good to know what kind of argument the Buddha is making here.  Epistemological? Ontological? Metaphysical?  Likely the latter two...