Vasubandhu's Critique of the Soul (Goodman), in Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings

Vasubandhu's Critique of the Soul (Goodman), in Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings
Subject Matter:
Goodman gives us a translation of another section of Vasubandhu's Ch 9 from the Abhidharmakosa.  This time, however, it is a (severely lopsided) debate between him and the Tirthikas (or "forders"...as in, those who ford the Ganges), a non-Buddhist group who would eventually come to be what we now call "Hindus."
Goodman offers a brief introduction to the time period and lays out the argument and finally gives us his translation of a passage.
Also, Goodman believes that Vasubandhu either directly or indirectly addresses some other Indian philosophical groups as well: the Nyayas-Vasaisikas as well as the Samkyas.  The Nyayas are logicians/epistemologists while the Samkyas are metaphysicians, and both, together, believe in the existence of an eternal atman or soul.  The Samkyas are related to the debate as well, for their strongsuit is in linguistics, offering arguments for the existence of the Self based on action/agent debates.
Primary Argument:
The primary argument Vasubandhu makes in this section of Ch 9 is against the existence of an atman.  Whereas in the previous chapter, he argues against the idea of the pudgala, this is likely an 'easier' argument for him.  In the very least, he makes the Tirthikas look more outlandish than the Pudgalavadins...
In essence, he refutes several claims made by the opponent regarding the existence of an unchanging, permanent soul, or atman. One of the important points his refutation is based upon is the following:  a permanent, unchanging thing cannot act differently at different times.  What we conventionally designate as 'persons' are regularly changing (every moment, in fact)...this, our observations can easily tell us.  As such, the idea of an ultimately existent self - which would have to be permanent and unchanging - is untenable.  Basically, if the Tirthikas accept the premise that to 'ultimately exist' is to exist in an unchanging, permanent manner (and thus unable to interact with anything or cause an effect), they are doomed to lose the argument.
Also, the idea that for there to be an action, there must be an agent, is not defendable according to Vasubandhu. There is a casual basis between the various causes of an action (the aggregates, etc) but this does not require an agent.
Method:
Translation from the Sanskrit original that Duerlinger likely used, as well as a short historical reconstruction of the time period and philosophical mileau in India at the time.
Key Points/Free Write:
Again, I am left to ponder what exactly I can take away from reading this philosophy.  How relevant are the questions and debates that Vasubandhu/the Tirthikas are having?  I have this feeling that there is important material concerning the conception of the self that is present in these ancient Indian sources...I'm just not sure how to sift them out, or what questions to ask.  I'll keep pushing on because I think it's due time for someone to write about selfhood in the mindfulness based psychotherapy movement...