Showing posts with label Abhidharmakosa. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Abhidharmakosa. Show all posts
Wednesday, February 1, 2012
Tuesday, January 31, 2012
Vasubandhu's Critique of the Soul (Goodman), in Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings
Vasubandhu's Critique of the Soul (Goodman), in Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings
Subject Matter:
Goodman gives us a translation of another section of Vasubandhu's Ch 9 from the Abhidharmakosa. This time, however, it is a (severely lopsided) debate between him and the Tirthikas (or "forders"...as in, those who ford the Ganges), a non-Buddhist group who would eventually come to be what we now call "Hindus."
Goodman offers a brief introduction to the time period and lays out the argument and finally gives us his translation of a passage.
Also, Goodman believes that Vasubandhu either directly or indirectly addresses some other Indian philosophical groups as well: the Nyayas-Vasaisikas as well as the Samkyas. The Nyayas are logicians/epistemologists while the Samkyas are metaphysicians, and both, together, believe in the existence of an eternal atman or soul. The Samkyas are related to the debate as well, for their strongsuit is in linguistics, offering arguments for the existence of the Self based on action/agent debates.
Primary Argument:
The primary argument Vasubandhu makes in this section of Ch 9 is against the existence of an atman. Whereas in the previous chapter, he argues against the idea of the pudgala, this is likely an 'easier' argument for him. In the very least, he makes the Tirthikas look more outlandish than the Pudgalavadins...
In essence, he refutes several claims made by the opponent regarding the existence of an unchanging, permanent soul, or atman. One of the important points his refutation is based upon is the following: a permanent, unchanging thing cannot act differently at different times. What we conventionally designate as 'persons' are regularly changing (every moment, in fact)...this, our observations can easily tell us. As such, the idea of an ultimately existent self - which would have to be permanent and unchanging - is untenable. Basically, if the Tirthikas accept the premise that to 'ultimately exist' is to exist in an unchanging, permanent manner (and thus unable to interact with anything or cause an effect), they are doomed to lose the argument.
Also, the idea that for there to be an action, there must be an agent, is not defendable according to Vasubandhu. There is a casual basis between the various causes of an action (the aggregates, etc) but this does not require an agent.
Method:
Translation from the Sanskrit original that Duerlinger likely used, as well as a short historical reconstruction of the time period and philosophical mileau in India at the time.
Key Points/Free Write:
Again, I am left to ponder what exactly I can take away from reading this philosophy. How relevant are the questions and debates that Vasubandhu/the Tirthikas are having? I have this feeling that there is important material concerning the conception of the self that is present in these ancient Indian sources...I'm just not sure how to sift them out, or what questions to ask. I'll keep pushing on because I think it's due time for someone to write about selfhood in the mindfulness based psychotherapy movement...
Subject Matter:
Goodman gives us a translation of another section of Vasubandhu's Ch 9 from the Abhidharmakosa. This time, however, it is a (severely lopsided) debate between him and the Tirthikas (or "forders"...as in, those who ford the Ganges), a non-Buddhist group who would eventually come to be what we now call "Hindus."
Goodman offers a brief introduction to the time period and lays out the argument and finally gives us his translation of a passage.
Also, Goodman believes that Vasubandhu either directly or indirectly addresses some other Indian philosophical groups as well: the Nyayas-Vasaisikas as well as the Samkyas. The Nyayas are logicians/epistemologists while the Samkyas are metaphysicians, and both, together, believe in the existence of an eternal atman or soul. The Samkyas are related to the debate as well, for their strongsuit is in linguistics, offering arguments for the existence of the Self based on action/agent debates.
Primary Argument:
The primary argument Vasubandhu makes in this section of Ch 9 is against the existence of an atman. Whereas in the previous chapter, he argues against the idea of the pudgala, this is likely an 'easier' argument for him. In the very least, he makes the Tirthikas look more outlandish than the Pudgalavadins...
In essence, he refutes several claims made by the opponent regarding the existence of an unchanging, permanent soul, or atman. One of the important points his refutation is based upon is the following: a permanent, unchanging thing cannot act differently at different times. What we conventionally designate as 'persons' are regularly changing (every moment, in fact)...this, our observations can easily tell us. As such, the idea of an ultimately existent self - which would have to be permanent and unchanging - is untenable. Basically, if the Tirthikas accept the premise that to 'ultimately exist' is to exist in an unchanging, permanent manner (and thus unable to interact with anything or cause an effect), they are doomed to lose the argument.
Also, the idea that for there to be an action, there must be an agent, is not defendable according to Vasubandhu. There is a casual basis between the various causes of an action (the aggregates, etc) but this does not require an agent.
Method:
Translation from the Sanskrit original that Duerlinger likely used, as well as a short historical reconstruction of the time period and philosophical mileau in India at the time.
Key Points/Free Write:
Again, I am left to ponder what exactly I can take away from reading this philosophy. How relevant are the questions and debates that Vasubandhu/the Tirthikas are having? I have this feeling that there is important material concerning the conception of the self that is present in these ancient Indian sources...I'm just not sure how to sift them out, or what questions to ask. I'll keep pushing on because I think it's due time for someone to write about selfhood in the mindfulness based psychotherapy movement...
Vasubandu's Critique of the Pudgalavadin's Theory of Persons (Duerlinger): Buddhist Philosophy, Essential Readings, Ch 25
Vasubandu's Abdhidharmakosa (Duerlinger): Buddhist Philosophy, Essential Readings, Ch 25
Subject:
Duerlinger gives us a short introduction to his article, consisting of a summary of Vasubandhu's argument in Chapter 9 of his tome-like Abhidharmakosa. Essentially, Duerlinger offers translation of two short passages of Vasubhandu's refutation of the Pudgalavadin's theory of self.
The Refutation was composed in the 4th/5th CE and primarily consists of the argument that persons do not exist in the sense that they do not possess and essence, or svabhava. In other words, persons do not possess person-properties or exist apart from being conceived in "dependence upon the causal continuum of the elements of their bodies and minds."
A more sustained look at Vasubandhu's refutation is provided in Duerlinger's volume (which will be the subject of a subsequent post.)
Primary Argument:
[This section consists of Vasubandhu, not Duerlinger's, argument.] Vasubandhu believes that the Pudgalavadin's theory of the self is incoherent and contradicts the teachings of the Buddha. First, pudgala means person, and serves as a conventional designation for "self." To the Pudgalavadins, the term pudgala obviates the svabhava-problem of self. There is no essence to persons, they argue, but only a pudgala which is an existent that depends on the aggregates, but is neither identical to nor different from the aggregates.
Vasubandhu finds this argument untenable for a number of reasons - some of which are quite convoluted and difficult to understand (and I don't want to understand them...). Controversially, the "Refutation" is based on premises that the Pudgalavadins would not likely hold. Primarily, he assumes that we exist (according to his own standards of existence), and therefore we must be either other than our aggregates or the same as them. The middle ground that the Pudgalavadins offer is not acceptable to Vasubandhu. The entire debate turns on a phrase (I don't know the Sanskrit) translated by Duerlinger, where the Pudgalavadins argue that a person is conceived "in reliance upon" the aggregates, rather than being the same as or different from, in the way that fire is conceived in reliance upon fuel.
Vasubandhu likens this argument to that of the Thirtikas-proponents of non-Buddhist philosophy at that time-who assert the existence of a substantial Self.
Method:
Duerlinger provides a translation of the Refutation which, I know from another source, comes from a Sanskrit translation of the treatise, originally discovered in Tibet in 1936, but is also available in Tibetan and Chinese (two separate translations).
Key Points/Free Write:
I think the key point to take away is that Chapter 9 of Vasubandhu's massive Abhidharmakosa is devoted to refuting certain theories of persons coming from both Buddhists (such as the Pudgalavadins) and non-Buddhist Indian philosophical schools (Thirtikas), and that his primary argument against the Pudgalavadins is that they try to say that the pudgala can be something neither the same as NOR different from the aggregates, something that Vasubandhu finds is untenable. This is all that interests me in terms of content.
In terms of how this chapter would relate to my project on self in psychotherapy, I think that the debate had by Vasubandhu and the Pudgalavadins may have some resonance today in considering my dissertation. How is it that the MBSR has become taken in by the 'self-help' crowd in America, despite the fact that mindfulness is 'based-on' so called traditional Buddhist teachings, such as those offered by Vasubandhu? Would the Pudgalavadin's ideas about person make more sense in today's MBSR community, namely, that there is some form of self that is related to the aggregates that is present enough to allow us to pursue self-help type activities?
Perhaps, on the other hand, the type of debate layed out by Vasubandhu doesn't map at all on to things I am thinking about in terms of self and mindfulness in psychotheraputic circles today...
Subject:
Duerlinger gives us a short introduction to his article, consisting of a summary of Vasubandhu's argument in Chapter 9 of his tome-like Abhidharmakosa. Essentially, Duerlinger offers translation of two short passages of Vasubhandu's refutation of the Pudgalavadin's theory of self.
The Refutation was composed in the 4th/5th CE and primarily consists of the argument that persons do not exist in the sense that they do not possess and essence, or svabhava. In other words, persons do not possess person-properties or exist apart from being conceived in "dependence upon the causal continuum of the elements of their bodies and minds."
A more sustained look at Vasubandhu's refutation is provided in Duerlinger's volume (which will be the subject of a subsequent post.)
Primary Argument:
[This section consists of Vasubandhu, not Duerlinger's, argument.] Vasubandhu believes that the Pudgalavadin's theory of the self is incoherent and contradicts the teachings of the Buddha. First, pudgala means person, and serves as a conventional designation for "self." To the Pudgalavadins, the term pudgala obviates the svabhava-problem of self. There is no essence to persons, they argue, but only a pudgala which is an existent that depends on the aggregates, but is neither identical to nor different from the aggregates.
Vasubandhu finds this argument untenable for a number of reasons - some of which are quite convoluted and difficult to understand (and I don't want to understand them...). Controversially, the "Refutation" is based on premises that the Pudgalavadins would not likely hold. Primarily, he assumes that we exist (according to his own standards of existence), and therefore we must be either other than our aggregates or the same as them. The middle ground that the Pudgalavadins offer is not acceptable to Vasubandhu. The entire debate turns on a phrase (I don't know the Sanskrit) translated by Duerlinger, where the Pudgalavadins argue that a person is conceived "in reliance upon" the aggregates, rather than being the same as or different from, in the way that fire is conceived in reliance upon fuel.
Vasubandhu likens this argument to that of the Thirtikas-proponents of non-Buddhist philosophy at that time-who assert the existence of a substantial Self.
Method:
Duerlinger provides a translation of the Refutation which, I know from another source, comes from a Sanskrit translation of the treatise, originally discovered in Tibet in 1936, but is also available in Tibetan and Chinese (two separate translations).
Key Points/Free Write:
I think the key point to take away is that Chapter 9 of Vasubandhu's massive Abhidharmakosa is devoted to refuting certain theories of persons coming from both Buddhists (such as the Pudgalavadins) and non-Buddhist Indian philosophical schools (Thirtikas), and that his primary argument against the Pudgalavadins is that they try to say that the pudgala can be something neither the same as NOR different from the aggregates, something that Vasubandhu finds is untenable. This is all that interests me in terms of content.
In terms of how this chapter would relate to my project on self in psychotherapy, I think that the debate had by Vasubandhu and the Pudgalavadins may have some resonance today in considering my dissertation. How is it that the MBSR has become taken in by the 'self-help' crowd in America, despite the fact that mindfulness is 'based-on' so called traditional Buddhist teachings, such as those offered by Vasubandhu? Would the Pudgalavadin's ideas about person make more sense in today's MBSR community, namely, that there is some form of self that is related to the aggregates that is present enough to allow us to pursue self-help type activities?
Perhaps, on the other hand, the type of debate layed out by Vasubandhu doesn't map at all on to things I am thinking about in terms of self and mindfulness in psychotheraputic circles today...
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