Vasubandhu's Critique of the Soul (Goodman), in Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings
Subject Matter:
Goodman gives us a translation of another section of Vasubandhu's Ch 9 from the Abhidharmakosa. This time, however, it is a (severely lopsided) debate between him and the Tirthikas (or "forders"...as in, those who ford the Ganges), a non-Buddhist group who would eventually come to be what we now call "Hindus."
Goodman offers a brief introduction to the time period and lays out the argument and finally gives us his translation of a passage.
Also, Goodman believes that Vasubandhu either directly or indirectly addresses some other Indian philosophical groups as well: the Nyayas-Vasaisikas as well as the Samkyas. The Nyayas are logicians/epistemologists while the Samkyas are metaphysicians, and both, together, believe in the existence of an eternal atman or soul. The Samkyas are related to the debate as well, for their strongsuit is in linguistics, offering arguments for the existence of the Self based on action/agent debates.
Primary Argument:
The primary argument Vasubandhu makes in this section of Ch 9 is against the existence of an atman. Whereas in the previous chapter, he argues against the idea of the pudgala, this is likely an 'easier' argument for him. In the very least, he makes the Tirthikas look more outlandish than the Pudgalavadins...
In essence, he refutes several claims made by the opponent regarding the existence of an unchanging, permanent soul, or atman. One of the important points his refutation is based upon is the following: a permanent, unchanging thing cannot act differently at different times. What we conventionally designate as 'persons' are regularly changing (every moment, in fact)...this, our observations can easily tell us. As such, the idea of an ultimately existent self - which would have to be permanent and unchanging - is untenable. Basically, if the Tirthikas accept the premise that to 'ultimately exist' is to exist in an unchanging, permanent manner (and thus unable to interact with anything or cause an effect), they are doomed to lose the argument.
Also, the idea that for there to be an action, there must be an agent, is not defendable according to Vasubandhu. There is a casual basis between the various causes of an action (the aggregates, etc) but this does not require an agent.
Method:
Translation from the Sanskrit original that Duerlinger likely used, as well as a short historical reconstruction of the time period and philosophical mileau in India at the time.
Key Points/Free Write:
Again, I am left to ponder what exactly I can take away from reading this philosophy. How relevant are the questions and debates that Vasubandhu/the Tirthikas are having? I have this feeling that there is important material concerning the conception of the self that is present in these ancient Indian sources...I'm just not sure how to sift them out, or what questions to ask. I'll keep pushing on because I think it's due time for someone to write about selfhood in the mindfulness based psychotherapy movement...
Tuesday, January 31, 2012
Vasubandu's Critique of the Pudgalavadin's Theory of Persons (Duerlinger): Buddhist Philosophy, Essential Readings, Ch 25
Vasubandu's Abdhidharmakosa (Duerlinger): Buddhist Philosophy, Essential Readings, Ch 25
Subject:
Duerlinger gives us a short introduction to his article, consisting of a summary of Vasubandhu's argument in Chapter 9 of his tome-like Abhidharmakosa. Essentially, Duerlinger offers translation of two short passages of Vasubhandu's refutation of the Pudgalavadin's theory of self.
The Refutation was composed in the 4th/5th CE and primarily consists of the argument that persons do not exist in the sense that they do not possess and essence, or svabhava. In other words, persons do not possess person-properties or exist apart from being conceived in "dependence upon the causal continuum of the elements of their bodies and minds."
A more sustained look at Vasubandhu's refutation is provided in Duerlinger's volume (which will be the subject of a subsequent post.)
Primary Argument:
[This section consists of Vasubandhu, not Duerlinger's, argument.] Vasubandhu believes that the Pudgalavadin's theory of the self is incoherent and contradicts the teachings of the Buddha. First, pudgala means person, and serves as a conventional designation for "self." To the Pudgalavadins, the term pudgala obviates the svabhava-problem of self. There is no essence to persons, they argue, but only a pudgala which is an existent that depends on the aggregates, but is neither identical to nor different from the aggregates.
Vasubandhu finds this argument untenable for a number of reasons - some of which are quite convoluted and difficult to understand (and I don't want to understand them...). Controversially, the "Refutation" is based on premises that the Pudgalavadins would not likely hold. Primarily, he assumes that we exist (according to his own standards of existence), and therefore we must be either other than our aggregates or the same as them. The middle ground that the Pudgalavadins offer is not acceptable to Vasubandhu. The entire debate turns on a phrase (I don't know the Sanskrit) translated by Duerlinger, where the Pudgalavadins argue that a person is conceived "in reliance upon" the aggregates, rather than being the same as or different from, in the way that fire is conceived in reliance upon fuel.
Vasubandhu likens this argument to that of the Thirtikas-proponents of non-Buddhist philosophy at that time-who assert the existence of a substantial Self.
Method:
Duerlinger provides a translation of the Refutation which, I know from another source, comes from a Sanskrit translation of the treatise, originally discovered in Tibet in 1936, but is also available in Tibetan and Chinese (two separate translations).
Key Points/Free Write:
I think the key point to take away is that Chapter 9 of Vasubandhu's massive Abhidharmakosa is devoted to refuting certain theories of persons coming from both Buddhists (such as the Pudgalavadins) and non-Buddhist Indian philosophical schools (Thirtikas), and that his primary argument against the Pudgalavadins is that they try to say that the pudgala can be something neither the same as NOR different from the aggregates, something that Vasubandhu finds is untenable. This is all that interests me in terms of content.
In terms of how this chapter would relate to my project on self in psychotherapy, I think that the debate had by Vasubandhu and the Pudgalavadins may have some resonance today in considering my dissertation. How is it that the MBSR has become taken in by the 'self-help' crowd in America, despite the fact that mindfulness is 'based-on' so called traditional Buddhist teachings, such as those offered by Vasubandhu? Would the Pudgalavadin's ideas about person make more sense in today's MBSR community, namely, that there is some form of self that is related to the aggregates that is present enough to allow us to pursue self-help type activities?
Perhaps, on the other hand, the type of debate layed out by Vasubandhu doesn't map at all on to things I am thinking about in terms of self and mindfulness in psychotheraputic circles today...
Subject:
Duerlinger gives us a short introduction to his article, consisting of a summary of Vasubandhu's argument in Chapter 9 of his tome-like Abhidharmakosa. Essentially, Duerlinger offers translation of two short passages of Vasubhandu's refutation of the Pudgalavadin's theory of self.
The Refutation was composed in the 4th/5th CE and primarily consists of the argument that persons do not exist in the sense that they do not possess and essence, or svabhava. In other words, persons do not possess person-properties or exist apart from being conceived in "dependence upon the causal continuum of the elements of their bodies and minds."
A more sustained look at Vasubandhu's refutation is provided in Duerlinger's volume (which will be the subject of a subsequent post.)
Primary Argument:
[This section consists of Vasubandhu, not Duerlinger's, argument.] Vasubandhu believes that the Pudgalavadin's theory of the self is incoherent and contradicts the teachings of the Buddha. First, pudgala means person, and serves as a conventional designation for "self." To the Pudgalavadins, the term pudgala obviates the svabhava-problem of self. There is no essence to persons, they argue, but only a pudgala which is an existent that depends on the aggregates, but is neither identical to nor different from the aggregates.
Vasubandhu finds this argument untenable for a number of reasons - some of which are quite convoluted and difficult to understand (and I don't want to understand them...). Controversially, the "Refutation" is based on premises that the Pudgalavadins would not likely hold. Primarily, he assumes that we exist (according to his own standards of existence), and therefore we must be either other than our aggregates or the same as them. The middle ground that the Pudgalavadins offer is not acceptable to Vasubandhu. The entire debate turns on a phrase (I don't know the Sanskrit) translated by Duerlinger, where the Pudgalavadins argue that a person is conceived "in reliance upon" the aggregates, rather than being the same as or different from, in the way that fire is conceived in reliance upon fuel.
Vasubandhu likens this argument to that of the Thirtikas-proponents of non-Buddhist philosophy at that time-who assert the existence of a substantial Self.
Method:
Duerlinger provides a translation of the Refutation which, I know from another source, comes from a Sanskrit translation of the treatise, originally discovered in Tibet in 1936, but is also available in Tibetan and Chinese (two separate translations).
Key Points/Free Write:
I think the key point to take away is that Chapter 9 of Vasubandhu's massive Abhidharmakosa is devoted to refuting certain theories of persons coming from both Buddhists (such as the Pudgalavadins) and non-Buddhist Indian philosophical schools (Thirtikas), and that his primary argument against the Pudgalavadins is that they try to say that the pudgala can be something neither the same as NOR different from the aggregates, something that Vasubandhu finds is untenable. This is all that interests me in terms of content.
In terms of how this chapter would relate to my project on self in psychotherapy, I think that the debate had by Vasubandhu and the Pudgalavadins may have some resonance today in considering my dissertation. How is it that the MBSR has become taken in by the 'self-help' crowd in America, despite the fact that mindfulness is 'based-on' so called traditional Buddhist teachings, such as those offered by Vasubandhu? Would the Pudgalavadin's ideas about person make more sense in today's MBSR community, namely, that there is some form of self that is related to the aggregates that is present enough to allow us to pursue self-help type activities?
Perhaps, on the other hand, the type of debate layed out by Vasubandhu doesn't map at all on to things I am thinking about in terms of self and mindfulness in psychotheraputic circles today...
Monday, January 30, 2012
Pudgalavada Doctrines of the Person (Lusthaus) Buddhist Philosophy, Essential Readings: Ch 24
Buddhist Philosophy, Essential Readings: Ch 24 (Lusthaus), Pudgalavadins
Subject:
The chapter consists of a defense of the Pudgalavadin (Vatsiputriyas) conceptions of personhood, focusing specifically on the concept of prajnapti which can variously mean heuristic/nominalist label/or literally "leading to knowledge." The Pudgalavadins argue that the pudgala (or person) is a prajnapti (or name/label for a complex of conditions) rather than a dravya, or real thing. In the first two pieces, they do this in the same three ways. Basically, Vasubhara argues that the purpose of prajnaptis (pudgala, in particular) is to dispel false views, namely, eternalism and annihilationism and the general existence of the person. FinallyVasumitra gives the basic layout of the tenets of the Pudgalavadin school, many of which concern the prajnapti of the pudgala.
Argument:
Lusthaus makes a few important points. First, he argues that the Pudgalavadins are misunderstood due to the beating they took from Vasubandhu, Candrakirti and Santaraksita in the Abhidharmakosa, Madhyamakavatara and Tatvasamgraha. Largely, the Vatsiputriyas were cariacaturized in these treatises, accused of espousing heretical doctrines. Furthermore, Lusthaus accuses modern scholars of relying on passages written by these commentators, rather than texts written by the Vatsiputriyas themselves.
Method:
I think Lusthaus relies on two Chines translations of what used to be the same text, but now is presented in two forms: one shorter, one longer form (Treatise on Liberation by the Threefold Teachings and Commentary on the Four Agammas), both of which are attributed to Vasubhadra. . Also, he gives a Chinese translation of Vasumitra's Tenets of Different Schools.
Key Points:
Lusthaus comes to the defense of the Pudgalavadins, and this is important for a number of reasons. First, he attempts to undermine the cariacature that has come to represent Pudgaladin conceptions of the peson, doing so by means of an investigation of extant Chinese texts. Second, he challenges modern scholars to look more closely at the Pudgalavadin position and not just accepting the Pudgalavadin representations cast by Candrakirti, Santaraksita and Vasubandhu (to name a few).
Subject:
The chapter consists of a defense of the Pudgalavadin (Vatsiputriyas) conceptions of personhood, focusing specifically on the concept of prajnapti which can variously mean heuristic/nominalist label/or literally "leading to knowledge." The Pudgalavadins argue that the pudgala (or person) is a prajnapti (or name/label for a complex of conditions) rather than a dravya, or real thing. In the first two pieces, they do this in the same three ways. Basically, Vasubhara argues that the purpose of prajnaptis (pudgala, in particular) is to dispel false views, namely, eternalism and annihilationism and the general existence of the person. FinallyVasumitra gives the basic layout of the tenets of the Pudgalavadin school, many of which concern the prajnapti of the pudgala.
Argument:
Lusthaus makes a few important points. First, he argues that the Pudgalavadins are misunderstood due to the beating they took from Vasubandhu, Candrakirti and Santaraksita in the Abhidharmakosa, Madhyamakavatara and Tatvasamgraha. Largely, the Vatsiputriyas were cariacaturized in these treatises, accused of espousing heretical doctrines. Furthermore, Lusthaus accuses modern scholars of relying on passages written by these commentators, rather than texts written by the Vatsiputriyas themselves.
Method:
I think Lusthaus relies on two Chines translations of what used to be the same text, but now is presented in two forms: one shorter, one longer form (Treatise on Liberation by the Threefold Teachings and Commentary on the Four Agammas), both of which are attributed to Vasubhadra. . Also, he gives a Chinese translation of Vasumitra's Tenets of Different Schools.
Key Points:
Lusthaus comes to the defense of the Pudgalavadins, and this is important for a number of reasons. First, he attempts to undermine the cariacature that has come to represent Pudgaladin conceptions of the peson, doing so by means of an investigation of extant Chinese texts. Second, he challenges modern scholars to look more closely at the Pudgalavadin position and not just accepting the Pudgalavadin representations cast by Candrakirti, Santaraksita and Vasubandhu (to name a few).
Therevadan Philosophy of Mind and the Person (Harvey) Buddhist Philosophy, Essential Readings: Ch 23
Ch 23:Therevadan Philosophy of Mind and the Person (Harvey)
Subject Matter:
This chapter presents translations of three classic discourses on the Self, two of which are in the Therevadan Pali canon and one which is a postcanonical text. They are the Anatta-lakkhanma Sutta, the Mahanidana Sutta and Milindapanha's Questions.
Harvey also gives a brief introduction to the "religio-philosophical context" of the Buddha. This amounts to the argument that, in the time of the Buddha, there existed three 'camps' with regard to conceptions of personhood: "eternalists," "annihilationishts," and "eel-wrigglers." The Buddha did not subscribe to any of these views, rather arguing that both mind and body are bundles of "changing, conditioned, and interacting processes."
The Anatta-lakkhan a Sutta is said to be the second sutta the Buddha gave and argues that each of the five aggregates cannot be said to be Self. Why? First, one cannot control them. Second, the aggregates are impermanent.
The Mahanidana Sutta (Great Discourse on Causal Links) considers three ways in which one can relate Self to "feeling." The sutta consists of refutations of the following three positions: 1) Self is identical to feeling 2) Self is not feeling and 3) Self feels (but is not feeling). The first cannot be true because feelings come and go as they please, unlike the Self. If happiness goes away, surely would the Self proposition #1 were true. Nor can the second be true because if Self was not feeling, how could one say, "I am?" Finally, if the Self merely feels, then feelings would have to cease (and this is not possible).
Finally, in King Milinda's Questions, the author utilizes the famous chariot argument to refute the existence of a single, permanent, unchanging self. "Just as, without an assemblage of parts,The word 'chariot' is used, So when the aggregates exist, There is the convention 'a being.'"
Primary Arguments:
Harvey does not make arguments, per se, but rather presents arguments by various figures from traditional Buddhist discourses. Among them, two involve the historical Buddha in a fashion consistent with other suttas, and the other concerning a 1st CE conversation between the Bactrian-Greek King Milinda and Nagasena. It seems like the authors of these texts (the Buddha?) employed classical Indian logic (?) to refute the existence of Self. It seems like the broader argument is an epistemological one, where one cannot know universals (not just the Self). These texts predate the Dharmakirti arguments against universals but seem to have some similarities and may serve as precursors of sorts.
'Method:
The bulk of the chapter is devoted to Harvey's translations (and reconstruction of philisophico-religious context at the time of the Buddha) of three Therevadan discourses on self.
Key Points:
These are three important discourses that someone studying Buddhist conceptions of Self should be familiar with and able to cite as instances of canonical (and post-canonical) refutations of Self in the Therevadan tradition.
It would also be good to know what kind of argument the Buddha is making here. Epistemological? Ontological? Metaphysical? Likely the latter two...
Subject Matter:
This chapter presents translations of three classic discourses on the Self, two of which are in the Therevadan Pali canon and one which is a postcanonical text. They are the Anatta-lakkhanma Sutta, the Mahanidana Sutta and Milindapanha's Questions.
Harvey also gives a brief introduction to the "religio-philosophical context" of the Buddha. This amounts to the argument that, in the time of the Buddha, there existed three 'camps' with regard to conceptions of personhood: "eternalists," "annihilationishts," and "eel-wrigglers." The Buddha did not subscribe to any of these views, rather arguing that both mind and body are bundles of "changing, conditioned, and interacting processes."
The Anatta-lakkhan a Sutta is said to be the second sutta the Buddha gave and argues that each of the five aggregates cannot be said to be Self. Why? First, one cannot control them. Second, the aggregates are impermanent.
The Mahanidana Sutta (Great Discourse on Causal Links) considers three ways in which one can relate Self to "feeling." The sutta consists of refutations of the following three positions: 1) Self is identical to feeling 2) Self is not feeling and 3) Self feels (but is not feeling). The first cannot be true because feelings come and go as they please, unlike the Self. If happiness goes away, surely would the Self proposition #1 were true. Nor can the second be true because if Self was not feeling, how could one say, "I am?" Finally, if the Self merely feels, then feelings would have to cease (and this is not possible).
Finally, in King Milinda's Questions, the author utilizes the famous chariot argument to refute the existence of a single, permanent, unchanging self. "Just as, without an assemblage of parts,The word 'chariot' is used, So when the aggregates exist, There is the convention 'a being.'"
Primary Arguments:
Harvey does not make arguments, per se, but rather presents arguments by various figures from traditional Buddhist discourses. Among them, two involve the historical Buddha in a fashion consistent with other suttas, and the other concerning a 1st CE conversation between the Bactrian-Greek King Milinda and Nagasena. It seems like the authors of these texts (the Buddha?) employed classical Indian logic (?) to refute the existence of Self. It seems like the broader argument is an epistemological one, where one cannot know universals (not just the Self). These texts predate the Dharmakirti arguments against universals but seem to have some similarities and may serve as precursors of sorts.
'Method:
The bulk of the chapter is devoted to Harvey's translations (and reconstruction of philisophico-religious context at the time of the Buddha) of three Therevadan discourses on self.
Key Points:
These are three important discourses that someone studying Buddhist conceptions of Self should be familiar with and able to cite as instances of canonical (and post-canonical) refutations of Self in the Therevadan tradition.
It would also be good to know what kind of argument the Buddha is making here. Epistemological? Ontological? Metaphysical? Likely the latter two...
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