Summary:
Herein, Martin Verhoeven gives a basic summary of the doctrine of No Self in Buddhism as part of a Zen-Catholic dialogue in Religion East and West. He argues that the doctrine is largely misunderstood as a form of nihilism and explains why this is not the case. First, he explains how the Buddha taught anatman against the background of Brahmanical conceptions of atman, something with which many interested in Catholic scholarship may not be familiar. Second, he discusses the development of No Self from the absence of 'self' to the absence of any inherent reality to any dharmas whatsoever.
Next, he explains the connection between the belief in Self and suffering and, conversely, the correct understanding of No Self and the attainment of nirvana. Rather than relying on some sort of metaphysical speculation, Verhoeven argues, the Buddha taught "what would lead to calming, knowledge enlightenment and nirvana." It is not the case that he did not have answers to the metaphysical questions, but that they did not contribute to ending samsaric existence. He then discusses the story of the poison arrow for clarification.
If we experience personhood, but there is no Self, then what constitutes our false experience of Selfhood? Of course, this is the five skandhas. The idea that the five skandhas combine to create our experience of the self helps distinguish Buddhist thought from forms of nihilism because it helps account for our moment to moment existence in the absence of a Self.
How are we to attain No Self, he asks? By ending philosophical posturing and resorting to the primacy of everyday experience and the noble eightfold path. By relying on a less philosophical orientation, "the abstract concepts of 'no-self' and 'emptiness' get translated into the more concrete expressions of nonattachment and nonhindrance"(p.103).
In the end, Verhoeven explains how the Buddha anticipated the fears of nihilism that his doctrine of No Self would create, citing his statement:
"There is an unborn, unarisen, uncreated, unconditioned; if there were no unborn, there would be no release for what is born, arisen, created and conditioned."
This demonstrates how the Buddha steered a middle course between eternalism and annihilationism in the teaching of No Self.
Reflection:
This is a well-written article meant for an audience that is interested in interreligious dialogue. Though there is little to no content dealing specifically with Catholic ideas, it seems that the relatively superficial investigation into the doctrine of No Self was geared less to a Buddhist audience and more toward an interreligious one.
Furthermore, defending the doctrine against charges of nihilism is a comparably easier enterprise than a lot of other scholars studying No Self are engaged in presently. Charges of nihilism, though uninformed, are rampant in non-Buddhist circles when it comes to anatman. This aside, he does a nice job of introducing the doctrine of No Self, why some believe it is nihilistic, and how one is supposed to come to realize anatman.
Monday, March 19, 2012
Wednesday, February 22, 2012
Concealed Art of the Soul (Jonardon Ganeri)
"Among the philosophers of classical India, some speak of a possibility we should not and indeed cannot ignore. It is the possibility that we have got it wrong about the relationship between ourselves and the world. The mistake we have made is not catastrophic but tragic. Its tragedy lies in the fact that there are lives to be led that are so much better, so much more to the point than the ones we do in fact lead, lives not inaccessible but merely hidden, lying just out of view."(pg. 1)
Summary of Contents:
Ch 1. The truth of the self according to the Upanisads has historically been concealed on a number of levels. First, by sages through various metaphors. Second, according to Buddhist doctrine, the truth of dukkha is concealed from us, as we all live in error about the causes of suffering, in particular, how we relate to the self.
Ch 2. The Buddha employs silence, secrecy and the metaphor of the snake to help teach the fundamental tenants of Buddhism. This is in contrast to simply announcing the truth of the nature of suffering and our potential for release.
Ch 3. Deceit plays an important role, in particular, in the Mahabarata.
Ch 4. The Buddha taught in a protreptic fashion in which the goal is to get the listener to adopt his ethical point of view as well as his fundamental outlook and behavior. One can say that he offers graded teachings to help unravel the truth, rather than simply announcing it, as a means of accomplishing the protreptic aim.
What is this truth? The Buddha and the Upanisads offer the truth of the self, and Ch 4/5 explore what exactly this is. Ch 4. focuses on the Madhyamaka answer to the question of "What is the self?" by saying that the Buddha said one thing but thought another. In other words, the Madhyamakas attempted to take the Buddha's words, which he uttered with complete skill so as to help liberate his followers, and infer back to what he really thought the self was. In other words, the took the medicine of this teachings on self and inferred back to what the anatomy of the self was.
Ch 5. (Did not read because it focused heavily on the Upandisads)
Ch 6. An exploration of the various conceptions of the ontology of the self, especially with regard to its relationship to the skandhas. In particular, he focuses on the reductionist viewpoint of Vasubhandu.
Ch 7. Ganeri gives three Madhyamaka readings on the no-self thesis and then considers the possibility that the self can be conceived of as a performance. The three readings are as follows: Nagarjuna (c.150 c.e.), Aryadeva (c. 180 c.e.) and Candrakirti (c. 600-650 c.e.). These arguments are all irrealist, but also anti-reductive: selves are not real things out there in the world, but neither are they reducible to streams of psycho physical constituents. In the end, Ganeri believes that these three philosophers hold that self is a performance or deed (as Nietzsche would have it).
These three arguments are anti-reductive because they are in contrast to the reductive thesis that statements in a disputed discourse, when true, are true because of the the truth of statements in another discourse, one whose terms refer to entities whose status is less problematic. In other words, the statements about the self are made true by the statements in the language of psycho-physical constituents. Vasubandhu is an example of a reductionist whereas the above three are all anti-reductive for reasons explained on pg. 187. Each of these theorists (and contemporary ones such as Campbell, Sorabji and Nagel) must contend with the relationship between the ontology of the self and psycho-physical constituents (be they realist or irrealist).
The arguments are irrealist, furthermore, because though they agree with the realists that the language of the self is a language of referring terms, they believe that there is no substantial essential existence in the entities in question. In other words, our discourse on the self is a) representational and b) in error, as opposed to the realists, who hold that our discourse is representational and without error. This position is the error-theoretic position. [The other irrealist position disagrees that the language of the self consists of referring terms, alternatively arguing that statements about the self are neither true nor referring. These non-factualists hold that ethical statements are not to assert anything, but to express a moral attitude and prescribe modes of conduct. ]
The three positions on self in question are as follows. First, the reductionist viewpoint (a la Vasubandhu), that there is no sui generis entitty irreducible to psycho-physical aggregates. Second, the error-theoretic irrealist, believes that discourse on the self is representational in nature, but there is nothing in fact that the discourse refers to (Advaita Vedanta position). The non-factual realist irrealist (like the Upanisads), finally, does not believe our language of self is even true to its representational function.
Candrakirti, Nagarjuna and Arydeva are non-factual irrealists, in that language about the self is appropriative rather than representational, and do not describe any real entity out there in the world. Ganeri calls this the Performativist View.
Argument:
A primary argument Ganeri makes in Part I is that the philosophy/therapy that the Buddha espouses has to be taught in a manner conducive for the liberation of his listeners. One way the Buddha accomplished this aim was to teach in a protreptic, or graded, fashion. Therefore, there exist tropes of secrecy and deceit that have roots in the Upanisadic tradition, as well as parables and metaphors from the Nikaya.
Part II is based on the argument that the Buddha and the Upanisads employed different philosophical doctrines but used the same method because both presume that philosophical inquiry and the practices of truth are arts of the soul and a means to cultivating impartiality, self-control, steadiness of mind, toleration and non-violence.
Finally, Part III intends to understand what can be said of the self. He explores four views on the self. Two are realist (non-reductive realism and reductionism) and two are irrealist (error-theoretic view and the non-factualist view. The non-reductive realist is the Nyaya-Vaisesika (and the Cartesian) view, while Vasubandhu espouses the reductionist view. Of the irrealists, the Upanisads/Advaita Vedanta is the error-theoretic while the Madhyamaka is the non-factualist view point.
Method:
In Part I, Ganeri is a participant located 'inside' the texts, trying to be engaged, open and receptive to the understanding of self and world each of the texts instils.
In Part II, he examines the texts from the 'outside,' looking at them as complex and sophisticated philosophical vehicles aimed at self-transformation.
Part III, finally, is still 'outside' the text, but they are now bearers of content, rather than vehicles for transformation.
Furthermore, he argues that one must be able to adopt all these perspectives at one time if one wants to fully understand the texts. In the end, he uses the term ressourcement, as well anticipation and intratextual 'open spaces', to describe his method. Inherent in this perspective is the acknowledgement of the importance of intellectual context and authorial perspective.
Reflection:
All in all, I feel that this is an outstanding work of scholarship in which I a) began to understand the philosophical classification of the various views on self in classical Indian Philosophy and Buddhist Philosophy, b) explored the nuances of the various arguments against the self, especially in how the self relates to the skandhas and c) surprisingly, was treated to an exploration of how the self is discussed in classical Indian literature and why it is important in the first place. These three take-away points will certainly be helpful as I move forward in my study of the self.
In particular, his discussion of protreptic nature of the Buddha's teachings was illuminating. A protreptic method is one based on the idea that one teaches a subject by explaining and rejecting the various views that came before it, encouraging a listener to adopt the view of the speaker, using upon previous lessons/teachings, but in the end, coming to a more nuanced (and correct) understanding of a given subject. In other words, Ganeri says, "The term protreptic refers to a type of exhortative or admonitory discourse designed to make persons rethink their ethical beliefs and convert to a fundamental change of outlook and behavior."
The content, rather than the arguments he makes or methods he employs, is what I will primarily take away. This is stuff I have to know to be able to write intelligently about Buddhist notions of selfhood, even if I'm focusing particularly on the Buddhist self in the West.
Summary of Contents:
Ch 1. The truth of the self according to the Upanisads has historically been concealed on a number of levels. First, by sages through various metaphors. Second, according to Buddhist doctrine, the truth of dukkha is concealed from us, as we all live in error about the causes of suffering, in particular, how we relate to the self.
Ch 2. The Buddha employs silence, secrecy and the metaphor of the snake to help teach the fundamental tenants of Buddhism. This is in contrast to simply announcing the truth of the nature of suffering and our potential for release.
Ch 3. Deceit plays an important role, in particular, in the Mahabarata.
Ch 4. The Buddha taught in a protreptic fashion in which the goal is to get the listener to adopt his ethical point of view as well as his fundamental outlook and behavior. One can say that he offers graded teachings to help unravel the truth, rather than simply announcing it, as a means of accomplishing the protreptic aim.
What is this truth? The Buddha and the Upanisads offer the truth of the self, and Ch 4/5 explore what exactly this is. Ch 4. focuses on the Madhyamaka answer to the question of "What is the self?" by saying that the Buddha said one thing but thought another. In other words, the Madhyamakas attempted to take the Buddha's words, which he uttered with complete skill so as to help liberate his followers, and infer back to what he really thought the self was. In other words, the took the medicine of this teachings on self and inferred back to what the anatomy of the self was.
Ch 5. (Did not read because it focused heavily on the Upandisads)
Ch 6. An exploration of the various conceptions of the ontology of the self, especially with regard to its relationship to the skandhas. In particular, he focuses on the reductionist viewpoint of Vasubhandu.
Ch 7. Ganeri gives three Madhyamaka readings on the no-self thesis and then considers the possibility that the self can be conceived of as a performance. The three readings are as follows: Nagarjuna (c.150 c.e.), Aryadeva (c. 180 c.e.) and Candrakirti (c. 600-650 c.e.). These arguments are all irrealist, but also anti-reductive: selves are not real things out there in the world, but neither are they reducible to streams of psycho physical constituents. In the end, Ganeri believes that these three philosophers hold that self is a performance or deed (as Nietzsche would have it).
These three arguments are anti-reductive because they are in contrast to the reductive thesis that statements in a disputed discourse, when true, are true because of the the truth of statements in another discourse, one whose terms refer to entities whose status is less problematic. In other words, the statements about the self are made true by the statements in the language of psycho-physical constituents. Vasubandhu is an example of a reductionist whereas the above three are all anti-reductive for reasons explained on pg. 187. Each of these theorists (and contemporary ones such as Campbell, Sorabji and Nagel) must contend with the relationship between the ontology of the self and psycho-physical constituents (be they realist or irrealist).
The arguments are irrealist, furthermore, because though they agree with the realists that the language of the self is a language of referring terms, they believe that there is no substantial essential existence in the entities in question. In other words, our discourse on the self is a) representational and b) in error, as opposed to the realists, who hold that our discourse is representational and without error. This position is the error-theoretic position. [The other irrealist position disagrees that the language of the self consists of referring terms, alternatively arguing that statements about the self are neither true nor referring. These non-factualists hold that ethical statements are not to assert anything, but to express a moral attitude and prescribe modes of conduct. ]
The three positions on self in question are as follows. First, the reductionist viewpoint (a la Vasubandhu), that there is no sui generis entitty irreducible to psycho-physical aggregates. Second, the error-theoretic irrealist, believes that discourse on the self is representational in nature, but there is nothing in fact that the discourse refers to (Advaita Vedanta position). The non-factual realist irrealist (like the Upanisads), finally, does not believe our language of self is even true to its representational function.
Candrakirti, Nagarjuna and Arydeva are non-factual irrealists, in that language about the self is appropriative rather than representational, and do not describe any real entity out there in the world. Ganeri calls this the Performativist View.
Argument:
A primary argument Ganeri makes in Part I is that the philosophy/therapy that the Buddha espouses has to be taught in a manner conducive for the liberation of his listeners. One way the Buddha accomplished this aim was to teach in a protreptic, or graded, fashion. Therefore, there exist tropes of secrecy and deceit that have roots in the Upanisadic tradition, as well as parables and metaphors from the Nikaya.
Part II is based on the argument that the Buddha and the Upanisads employed different philosophical doctrines but used the same method because both presume that philosophical inquiry and the practices of truth are arts of the soul and a means to cultivating impartiality, self-control, steadiness of mind, toleration and non-violence.
Finally, Part III intends to understand what can be said of the self. He explores four views on the self. Two are realist (non-reductive realism and reductionism) and two are irrealist (error-theoretic view and the non-factualist view. The non-reductive realist is the Nyaya-Vaisesika (and the Cartesian) view, while Vasubandhu espouses the reductionist view. Of the irrealists, the Upanisads/Advaita Vedanta is the error-theoretic while the Madhyamaka is the non-factualist view point.
Method:
In Part I, Ganeri is a participant located 'inside' the texts, trying to be engaged, open and receptive to the understanding of self and world each of the texts instils.
In Part II, he examines the texts from the 'outside,' looking at them as complex and sophisticated philosophical vehicles aimed at self-transformation.
Part III, finally, is still 'outside' the text, but they are now bearers of content, rather than vehicles for transformation.
Furthermore, he argues that one must be able to adopt all these perspectives at one time if one wants to fully understand the texts. In the end, he uses the term ressourcement, as well anticipation and intratextual 'open spaces', to describe his method. Inherent in this perspective is the acknowledgement of the importance of intellectual context and authorial perspective.
Reflection:
All in all, I feel that this is an outstanding work of scholarship in which I a) began to understand the philosophical classification of the various views on self in classical Indian Philosophy and Buddhist Philosophy, b) explored the nuances of the various arguments against the self, especially in how the self relates to the skandhas and c) surprisingly, was treated to an exploration of how the self is discussed in classical Indian literature and why it is important in the first place. These three take-away points will certainly be helpful as I move forward in my study of the self.
In particular, his discussion of protreptic nature of the Buddha's teachings was illuminating. A protreptic method is one based on the idea that one teaches a subject by explaining and rejecting the various views that came before it, encouraging a listener to adopt the view of the speaker, using upon previous lessons/teachings, but in the end, coming to a more nuanced (and correct) understanding of a given subject. In other words, Ganeri says, "The term protreptic refers to a type of exhortative or admonitory discourse designed to make persons rethink their ethical beliefs and convert to a fundamental change of outlook and behavior."
The content, rather than the arguments he makes or methods he employs, is what I will primarily take away. This is stuff I have to know to be able to write intelligently about Buddhist notions of selfhood, even if I'm focusing particularly on the Buddhist self in the West.
Wednesday, February 1, 2012
Candrakirti's Madhyamakavatarabhasya (Huntington Jr.), Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings
Candrakirti's Madhyamakavatarabhasya (Huntington Jr.), Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings
Subject Matter:
This section concerns a portion of Candrakirti's seminal 6-7th CE work, called the Entry into the Middle Way and it's commentary, or the Madhyamakavatarabhasya. In chapter 6, he deals with philosophical concerns regarding various views on the self. His two main 'opponents,' if they can be called that, are the Indian and Buddhist monists/idealists and the Indian dualists. These are the Advaita Vedanta (to name one), the Vijnanavada, and the Upanisads. Candrakirti undermines the monism/dualism debate by coming to a middle way, so to speak.
Both idealism and dualism are forms of reification. It is not possible to attribute real inherent existence (svabhava) to either mind, matter or both. Consciousness can only be defined in relation to subjective (mental) and objective (material) others. In this way, both observer and observed are ultimately merely provisional, lacking any objective existence.
Primary Argument:
How does Candrakiriti come to this conclusion? His arguments are quintessentially Madhyamaka. He is refuting the position of his primary opponents, the Vijnanavadas, or "mind-only" school, by criticizing them of reifying a provisional teaching of the Buddha into something that is objectively and inherently true, or "ultimate."
The argument comes down to the fact that Candrakirti holds the teaching that only mind exists is a provisional one, while the Yogacara school believes it to be an ultimate teaching. He believes that the mind-only teaching is meant to be delivered to those who grasp onto views that the material world is objectively true, but it actually is merely conventionally true. On the other hand, the Yogacara holds the position to be ultimately true. Candrakirti says that with a higher level of understanding, the mind is not even objectively/inherently "real", but only provisionally or relatively real based on the fact that it exists only in relation to other entities such as material form (rupa). In this sense, both mind and matter are merely relatively or conventionally true, with Candrakirti saying, "...none of the five (aggregates) appears to a yogi who pursues illuminating knowledge of reality," and "If form does not exist, then do not cling to the existence of mind."
Another argument stems from a statement of the Buddha, in which he purportedly said that the mind is "produced from delusion (moha) and volitional action (karman) so it could not be objectively true.
Method:
I'm not quite sure what method Huntington uses, but likely he translated the Madhyamakavataraabhasya from its Sanskrit original and then summarized the main points. What is that? A historical reconstruction?
Key Points/Free Write:
How does this relate to the contemporary study of the self in America today? Key is the way in which Candrakirti relegates the teachings of the Yogacara school to the status of merely "provisional," something to which they would likely take offense. Is that what we are doing in the context of MBSR and mindfulness based psychotherapies? If the teachings are ultimately founded in the teachings of the Buddha, that ultimately, there is no self, how can we understand the way in which the self has been appropriated for the self-help cause with regard to its usage in mindfulness? I think it is safe to say that Buddhist philosophers would say that, "Sure, this teaching is useful in the West, especially insofar as it alleviates suffering. But ultimately, once the practitioners have advanced to a certain level, they have to let go of the reified belief in the self. Much as he felt that the idea that material form (rupa) is non-existent should be taught to those who cling to the inherent existence of the "objective world," because it would serve as an antidote (to use the metaphor of the Buddha as teacher), he would say that the idea that the self exists conventionally can be emphasized to a group of Buddhist practitioners in the West who are so ingrained in the culture that a teaching about the emptiness of self would actually be detrimental on the path to alleviating human suffering. So...MBSR = a provisional teaching?
Subject Matter:
This section concerns a portion of Candrakirti's seminal 6-7th CE work, called the Entry into the Middle Way and it's commentary, or the Madhyamakavatarabhasya. In chapter 6, he deals with philosophical concerns regarding various views on the self. His two main 'opponents,' if they can be called that, are the Indian and Buddhist monists/idealists and the Indian dualists. These are the Advaita Vedanta (to name one), the Vijnanavada, and the Upanisads. Candrakirti undermines the monism/dualism debate by coming to a middle way, so to speak.
Both idealism and dualism are forms of reification. It is not possible to attribute real inherent existence (svabhava) to either mind, matter or both. Consciousness can only be defined in relation to subjective (mental) and objective (material) others. In this way, both observer and observed are ultimately merely provisional, lacking any objective existence.
Primary Argument:
How does Candrakiriti come to this conclusion? His arguments are quintessentially Madhyamaka. He is refuting the position of his primary opponents, the Vijnanavadas, or "mind-only" school, by criticizing them of reifying a provisional teaching of the Buddha into something that is objectively and inherently true, or "ultimate."
The argument comes down to the fact that Candrakirti holds the teaching that only mind exists is a provisional one, while the Yogacara school believes it to be an ultimate teaching. He believes that the mind-only teaching is meant to be delivered to those who grasp onto views that the material world is objectively true, but it actually is merely conventionally true. On the other hand, the Yogacara holds the position to be ultimately true. Candrakirti says that with a higher level of understanding, the mind is not even objectively/inherently "real", but only provisionally or relatively real based on the fact that it exists only in relation to other entities such as material form (rupa). In this sense, both mind and matter are merely relatively or conventionally true, with Candrakirti saying, "...none of the five (aggregates) appears to a yogi who pursues illuminating knowledge of reality," and "If form does not exist, then do not cling to the existence of mind."
Another argument stems from a statement of the Buddha, in which he purportedly said that the mind is "produced from delusion (moha) and volitional action (karman) so it could not be objectively true.
Method:
I'm not quite sure what method Huntington uses, but likely he translated the Madhyamakavataraabhasya from its Sanskrit original and then summarized the main points. What is that? A historical reconstruction?
Key Points/Free Write:
How does this relate to the contemporary study of the self in America today? Key is the way in which Candrakirti relegates the teachings of the Yogacara school to the status of merely "provisional," something to which they would likely take offense. Is that what we are doing in the context of MBSR and mindfulness based psychotherapies? If the teachings are ultimately founded in the teachings of the Buddha, that ultimately, there is no self, how can we understand the way in which the self has been appropriated for the self-help cause with regard to its usage in mindfulness? I think it is safe to say that Buddhist philosophers would say that, "Sure, this teaching is useful in the West, especially insofar as it alleviates suffering. But ultimately, once the practitioners have advanced to a certain level, they have to let go of the reified belief in the self. Much as he felt that the idea that material form (rupa) is non-existent should be taught to those who cling to the inherent existence of the "objective world," because it would serve as an antidote (to use the metaphor of the Buddha as teacher), he would say that the idea that the self exists conventionally can be emphasized to a group of Buddhist practitioners in the West who are so ingrained in the culture that a teaching about the emptiness of self would actually be detrimental on the path to alleviating human suffering. So...MBSR = a provisional teaching?
Tuesday, January 31, 2012
Vasubandhu's Critique of the Soul (Goodman), in Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings
Vasubandhu's Critique of the Soul (Goodman), in Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings
Subject Matter:
Goodman gives us a translation of another section of Vasubandhu's Ch 9 from the Abhidharmakosa. This time, however, it is a (severely lopsided) debate between him and the Tirthikas (or "forders"...as in, those who ford the Ganges), a non-Buddhist group who would eventually come to be what we now call "Hindus."
Goodman offers a brief introduction to the time period and lays out the argument and finally gives us his translation of a passage.
Also, Goodman believes that Vasubandhu either directly or indirectly addresses some other Indian philosophical groups as well: the Nyayas-Vasaisikas as well as the Samkyas. The Nyayas are logicians/epistemologists while the Samkyas are metaphysicians, and both, together, believe in the existence of an eternal atman or soul. The Samkyas are related to the debate as well, for their strongsuit is in linguistics, offering arguments for the existence of the Self based on action/agent debates.
Primary Argument:
The primary argument Vasubandhu makes in this section of Ch 9 is against the existence of an atman. Whereas in the previous chapter, he argues against the idea of the pudgala, this is likely an 'easier' argument for him. In the very least, he makes the Tirthikas look more outlandish than the Pudgalavadins...
In essence, he refutes several claims made by the opponent regarding the existence of an unchanging, permanent soul, or atman. One of the important points his refutation is based upon is the following: a permanent, unchanging thing cannot act differently at different times. What we conventionally designate as 'persons' are regularly changing (every moment, in fact)...this, our observations can easily tell us. As such, the idea of an ultimately existent self - which would have to be permanent and unchanging - is untenable. Basically, if the Tirthikas accept the premise that to 'ultimately exist' is to exist in an unchanging, permanent manner (and thus unable to interact with anything or cause an effect), they are doomed to lose the argument.
Also, the idea that for there to be an action, there must be an agent, is not defendable according to Vasubandhu. There is a casual basis between the various causes of an action (the aggregates, etc) but this does not require an agent.
Method:
Translation from the Sanskrit original that Duerlinger likely used, as well as a short historical reconstruction of the time period and philosophical mileau in India at the time.
Key Points/Free Write:
Again, I am left to ponder what exactly I can take away from reading this philosophy. How relevant are the questions and debates that Vasubandhu/the Tirthikas are having? I have this feeling that there is important material concerning the conception of the self that is present in these ancient Indian sources...I'm just not sure how to sift them out, or what questions to ask. I'll keep pushing on because I think it's due time for someone to write about selfhood in the mindfulness based psychotherapy movement...
Subject Matter:
Goodman gives us a translation of another section of Vasubandhu's Ch 9 from the Abhidharmakosa. This time, however, it is a (severely lopsided) debate between him and the Tirthikas (or "forders"...as in, those who ford the Ganges), a non-Buddhist group who would eventually come to be what we now call "Hindus."
Goodman offers a brief introduction to the time period and lays out the argument and finally gives us his translation of a passage.
Also, Goodman believes that Vasubandhu either directly or indirectly addresses some other Indian philosophical groups as well: the Nyayas-Vasaisikas as well as the Samkyas. The Nyayas are logicians/epistemologists while the Samkyas are metaphysicians, and both, together, believe in the existence of an eternal atman or soul. The Samkyas are related to the debate as well, for their strongsuit is in linguistics, offering arguments for the existence of the Self based on action/agent debates.
Primary Argument:
The primary argument Vasubandhu makes in this section of Ch 9 is against the existence of an atman. Whereas in the previous chapter, he argues against the idea of the pudgala, this is likely an 'easier' argument for him. In the very least, he makes the Tirthikas look more outlandish than the Pudgalavadins...
In essence, he refutes several claims made by the opponent regarding the existence of an unchanging, permanent soul, or atman. One of the important points his refutation is based upon is the following: a permanent, unchanging thing cannot act differently at different times. What we conventionally designate as 'persons' are regularly changing (every moment, in fact)...this, our observations can easily tell us. As such, the idea of an ultimately existent self - which would have to be permanent and unchanging - is untenable. Basically, if the Tirthikas accept the premise that to 'ultimately exist' is to exist in an unchanging, permanent manner (and thus unable to interact with anything or cause an effect), they are doomed to lose the argument.
Also, the idea that for there to be an action, there must be an agent, is not defendable according to Vasubandhu. There is a casual basis between the various causes of an action (the aggregates, etc) but this does not require an agent.
Method:
Translation from the Sanskrit original that Duerlinger likely used, as well as a short historical reconstruction of the time period and philosophical mileau in India at the time.
Key Points/Free Write:
Again, I am left to ponder what exactly I can take away from reading this philosophy. How relevant are the questions and debates that Vasubandhu/the Tirthikas are having? I have this feeling that there is important material concerning the conception of the self that is present in these ancient Indian sources...I'm just not sure how to sift them out, or what questions to ask. I'll keep pushing on because I think it's due time for someone to write about selfhood in the mindfulness based psychotherapy movement...
Vasubandu's Critique of the Pudgalavadin's Theory of Persons (Duerlinger): Buddhist Philosophy, Essential Readings, Ch 25
Vasubandu's Abdhidharmakosa (Duerlinger): Buddhist Philosophy, Essential Readings, Ch 25
Subject:
Duerlinger gives us a short introduction to his article, consisting of a summary of Vasubandhu's argument in Chapter 9 of his tome-like Abhidharmakosa. Essentially, Duerlinger offers translation of two short passages of Vasubhandu's refutation of the Pudgalavadin's theory of self.
The Refutation was composed in the 4th/5th CE and primarily consists of the argument that persons do not exist in the sense that they do not possess and essence, or svabhava. In other words, persons do not possess person-properties or exist apart from being conceived in "dependence upon the causal continuum of the elements of their bodies and minds."
A more sustained look at Vasubandhu's refutation is provided in Duerlinger's volume (which will be the subject of a subsequent post.)
Primary Argument:
[This section consists of Vasubandhu, not Duerlinger's, argument.] Vasubandhu believes that the Pudgalavadin's theory of the self is incoherent and contradicts the teachings of the Buddha. First, pudgala means person, and serves as a conventional designation for "self." To the Pudgalavadins, the term pudgala obviates the svabhava-problem of self. There is no essence to persons, they argue, but only a pudgala which is an existent that depends on the aggregates, but is neither identical to nor different from the aggregates.
Vasubandhu finds this argument untenable for a number of reasons - some of which are quite convoluted and difficult to understand (and I don't want to understand them...). Controversially, the "Refutation" is based on premises that the Pudgalavadins would not likely hold. Primarily, he assumes that we exist (according to his own standards of existence), and therefore we must be either other than our aggregates or the same as them. The middle ground that the Pudgalavadins offer is not acceptable to Vasubandhu. The entire debate turns on a phrase (I don't know the Sanskrit) translated by Duerlinger, where the Pudgalavadins argue that a person is conceived "in reliance upon" the aggregates, rather than being the same as or different from, in the way that fire is conceived in reliance upon fuel.
Vasubandhu likens this argument to that of the Thirtikas-proponents of non-Buddhist philosophy at that time-who assert the existence of a substantial Self.
Method:
Duerlinger provides a translation of the Refutation which, I know from another source, comes from a Sanskrit translation of the treatise, originally discovered in Tibet in 1936, but is also available in Tibetan and Chinese (two separate translations).
Key Points/Free Write:
I think the key point to take away is that Chapter 9 of Vasubandhu's massive Abhidharmakosa is devoted to refuting certain theories of persons coming from both Buddhists (such as the Pudgalavadins) and non-Buddhist Indian philosophical schools (Thirtikas), and that his primary argument against the Pudgalavadins is that they try to say that the pudgala can be something neither the same as NOR different from the aggregates, something that Vasubandhu finds is untenable. This is all that interests me in terms of content.
In terms of how this chapter would relate to my project on self in psychotherapy, I think that the debate had by Vasubandhu and the Pudgalavadins may have some resonance today in considering my dissertation. How is it that the MBSR has become taken in by the 'self-help' crowd in America, despite the fact that mindfulness is 'based-on' so called traditional Buddhist teachings, such as those offered by Vasubandhu? Would the Pudgalavadin's ideas about person make more sense in today's MBSR community, namely, that there is some form of self that is related to the aggregates that is present enough to allow us to pursue self-help type activities?
Perhaps, on the other hand, the type of debate layed out by Vasubandhu doesn't map at all on to things I am thinking about in terms of self and mindfulness in psychotheraputic circles today...
Subject:
Duerlinger gives us a short introduction to his article, consisting of a summary of Vasubandhu's argument in Chapter 9 of his tome-like Abhidharmakosa. Essentially, Duerlinger offers translation of two short passages of Vasubhandu's refutation of the Pudgalavadin's theory of self.
The Refutation was composed in the 4th/5th CE and primarily consists of the argument that persons do not exist in the sense that they do not possess and essence, or svabhava. In other words, persons do not possess person-properties or exist apart from being conceived in "dependence upon the causal continuum of the elements of their bodies and minds."
A more sustained look at Vasubandhu's refutation is provided in Duerlinger's volume (which will be the subject of a subsequent post.)
Primary Argument:
[This section consists of Vasubandhu, not Duerlinger's, argument.] Vasubandhu believes that the Pudgalavadin's theory of the self is incoherent and contradicts the teachings of the Buddha. First, pudgala means person, and serves as a conventional designation for "self." To the Pudgalavadins, the term pudgala obviates the svabhava-problem of self. There is no essence to persons, they argue, but only a pudgala which is an existent that depends on the aggregates, but is neither identical to nor different from the aggregates.
Vasubandhu finds this argument untenable for a number of reasons - some of which are quite convoluted and difficult to understand (and I don't want to understand them...). Controversially, the "Refutation" is based on premises that the Pudgalavadins would not likely hold. Primarily, he assumes that we exist (according to his own standards of existence), and therefore we must be either other than our aggregates or the same as them. The middle ground that the Pudgalavadins offer is not acceptable to Vasubandhu. The entire debate turns on a phrase (I don't know the Sanskrit) translated by Duerlinger, where the Pudgalavadins argue that a person is conceived "in reliance upon" the aggregates, rather than being the same as or different from, in the way that fire is conceived in reliance upon fuel.
Vasubandhu likens this argument to that of the Thirtikas-proponents of non-Buddhist philosophy at that time-who assert the existence of a substantial Self.
Method:
Duerlinger provides a translation of the Refutation which, I know from another source, comes from a Sanskrit translation of the treatise, originally discovered in Tibet in 1936, but is also available in Tibetan and Chinese (two separate translations).
Key Points/Free Write:
I think the key point to take away is that Chapter 9 of Vasubandhu's massive Abhidharmakosa is devoted to refuting certain theories of persons coming from both Buddhists (such as the Pudgalavadins) and non-Buddhist Indian philosophical schools (Thirtikas), and that his primary argument against the Pudgalavadins is that they try to say that the pudgala can be something neither the same as NOR different from the aggregates, something that Vasubandhu finds is untenable. This is all that interests me in terms of content.
In terms of how this chapter would relate to my project on self in psychotherapy, I think that the debate had by Vasubandhu and the Pudgalavadins may have some resonance today in considering my dissertation. How is it that the MBSR has become taken in by the 'self-help' crowd in America, despite the fact that mindfulness is 'based-on' so called traditional Buddhist teachings, such as those offered by Vasubandhu? Would the Pudgalavadin's ideas about person make more sense in today's MBSR community, namely, that there is some form of self that is related to the aggregates that is present enough to allow us to pursue self-help type activities?
Perhaps, on the other hand, the type of debate layed out by Vasubandhu doesn't map at all on to things I am thinking about in terms of self and mindfulness in psychotheraputic circles today...
Monday, January 30, 2012
Pudgalavada Doctrines of the Person (Lusthaus) Buddhist Philosophy, Essential Readings: Ch 24
Buddhist Philosophy, Essential Readings: Ch 24 (Lusthaus), Pudgalavadins
Subject:
The chapter consists of a defense of the Pudgalavadin (Vatsiputriyas) conceptions of personhood, focusing specifically on the concept of prajnapti which can variously mean heuristic/nominalist label/or literally "leading to knowledge." The Pudgalavadins argue that the pudgala (or person) is a prajnapti (or name/label for a complex of conditions) rather than a dravya, or real thing. In the first two pieces, they do this in the same three ways. Basically, Vasubhara argues that the purpose of prajnaptis (pudgala, in particular) is to dispel false views, namely, eternalism and annihilationism and the general existence of the person. FinallyVasumitra gives the basic layout of the tenets of the Pudgalavadin school, many of which concern the prajnapti of the pudgala.
Argument:
Lusthaus makes a few important points. First, he argues that the Pudgalavadins are misunderstood due to the beating they took from Vasubandhu, Candrakirti and Santaraksita in the Abhidharmakosa, Madhyamakavatara and Tatvasamgraha. Largely, the Vatsiputriyas were cariacaturized in these treatises, accused of espousing heretical doctrines. Furthermore, Lusthaus accuses modern scholars of relying on passages written by these commentators, rather than texts written by the Vatsiputriyas themselves.
Method:
I think Lusthaus relies on two Chines translations of what used to be the same text, but now is presented in two forms: one shorter, one longer form (Treatise on Liberation by the Threefold Teachings and Commentary on the Four Agammas), both of which are attributed to Vasubhadra. . Also, he gives a Chinese translation of Vasumitra's Tenets of Different Schools.
Key Points:
Lusthaus comes to the defense of the Pudgalavadins, and this is important for a number of reasons. First, he attempts to undermine the cariacature that has come to represent Pudgaladin conceptions of the peson, doing so by means of an investigation of extant Chinese texts. Second, he challenges modern scholars to look more closely at the Pudgalavadin position and not just accepting the Pudgalavadin representations cast by Candrakirti, Santaraksita and Vasubandhu (to name a few).
Subject:
The chapter consists of a defense of the Pudgalavadin (Vatsiputriyas) conceptions of personhood, focusing specifically on the concept of prajnapti which can variously mean heuristic/nominalist label/or literally "leading to knowledge." The Pudgalavadins argue that the pudgala (or person) is a prajnapti (or name/label for a complex of conditions) rather than a dravya, or real thing. In the first two pieces, they do this in the same three ways. Basically, Vasubhara argues that the purpose of prajnaptis (pudgala, in particular) is to dispel false views, namely, eternalism and annihilationism and the general existence of the person. FinallyVasumitra gives the basic layout of the tenets of the Pudgalavadin school, many of which concern the prajnapti of the pudgala.
Argument:
Lusthaus makes a few important points. First, he argues that the Pudgalavadins are misunderstood due to the beating they took from Vasubandhu, Candrakirti and Santaraksita in the Abhidharmakosa, Madhyamakavatara and Tatvasamgraha. Largely, the Vatsiputriyas were cariacaturized in these treatises, accused of espousing heretical doctrines. Furthermore, Lusthaus accuses modern scholars of relying on passages written by these commentators, rather than texts written by the Vatsiputriyas themselves.
Method:
I think Lusthaus relies on two Chines translations of what used to be the same text, but now is presented in two forms: one shorter, one longer form (Treatise on Liberation by the Threefold Teachings and Commentary on the Four Agammas), both of which are attributed to Vasubhadra. . Also, he gives a Chinese translation of Vasumitra's Tenets of Different Schools.
Key Points:
Lusthaus comes to the defense of the Pudgalavadins, and this is important for a number of reasons. First, he attempts to undermine the cariacature that has come to represent Pudgaladin conceptions of the peson, doing so by means of an investigation of extant Chinese texts. Second, he challenges modern scholars to look more closely at the Pudgalavadin position and not just accepting the Pudgalavadin representations cast by Candrakirti, Santaraksita and Vasubandhu (to name a few).
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)