"Among the philosophers of classical India, some speak of a possibility we should not and indeed cannot ignore. It is the possibility that we have got it wrong about the relationship between ourselves and the world. The mistake we have made is not catastrophic but tragic. Its tragedy lies in the fact that there are lives to be led that are so much better, so much more to the point than the ones we do in fact lead, lives not inaccessible but merely hidden, lying just out of view."(pg. 1)
Summary of Contents:
Ch 1. The truth of the self according to the Upanisads has historically been concealed on a number of levels. First, by sages through various metaphors. Second, according to Buddhist doctrine, the truth of dukkha is concealed from us, as we all live in error about the causes of suffering, in particular, how we relate to the self.
Ch 2. The Buddha employs silence, secrecy and the metaphor of the snake to help teach the fundamental tenants of Buddhism. This is in contrast to simply announcing the truth of the nature of suffering and our potential for release.
Ch 3. Deceit plays an important role, in particular, in the Mahabarata.
Ch 4. The Buddha taught in a protreptic fashion in which the goal is to get the listener to adopt his ethical point of view as well as his fundamental outlook and behavior. One can say that he offers graded teachings to help unravel the truth, rather than simply announcing it, as a means of accomplishing the protreptic aim.
What is this truth? The Buddha and the Upanisads offer the truth of the self, and Ch 4/5 explore what exactly this is. Ch 4. focuses on the Madhyamaka answer to the question of "What is the self?" by saying that the Buddha said one thing but thought another. In other words, the Madhyamakas attempted to take the Buddha's words, which he uttered with complete skill so as to help liberate his followers, and infer back to what he really thought the self was. In other words, the took the medicine of this teachings on self and inferred back to what the anatomy of the self was.
Ch 5. (Did not read because it focused heavily on the Upandisads)
Ch 6. An exploration of the various conceptions of the ontology of the self, especially with regard to its relationship to the skandhas. In particular, he focuses on the reductionist viewpoint of Vasubhandu.
Ch 7. Ganeri gives three Madhyamaka readings on the no-self thesis and then considers the possibility that the self can be conceived of as a performance. The three readings are as follows: Nagarjuna (c.150 c.e.), Aryadeva (c. 180 c.e.) and Candrakirti (c. 600-650 c.e.). These arguments are all irrealist, but also anti-reductive: selves are not real things out there in the world, but neither are they reducible to streams of psycho physical constituents. In the end, Ganeri believes that these three philosophers hold that self is a performance or deed (as Nietzsche would have it).
These three arguments are anti-reductive because they are in contrast to the reductive thesis that statements in a disputed discourse, when true, are true because of the the truth of statements in another discourse, one whose terms refer to entities whose status is less problematic. In other words, the statements about the self are made true by the statements in the language of psycho-physical constituents. Vasubandhu is an example of a reductionist whereas the above three are all anti-reductive for reasons explained on pg. 187. Each of these theorists (and contemporary ones such as Campbell, Sorabji and Nagel) must contend with the relationship between the ontology of the self and psycho-physical constituents (be they realist or irrealist).
The arguments are irrealist, furthermore, because though they agree with the realists that the language of the self is a language of referring terms, they believe that there is no substantial essential existence in the entities in question. In other words, our discourse on the self is a) representational and b) in error, as opposed to the realists, who hold that our discourse is representational and without error. This position is the error-theoretic position. [The other irrealist position disagrees that the language of the self consists of referring terms, alternatively arguing that statements about the self are neither true nor referring. These non-factualists hold that ethical statements are not to assert anything, but to express a moral attitude and prescribe modes of conduct. ]
The three positions on self in question are as follows. First, the reductionist viewpoint (a la Vasubandhu), that there is no sui generis entitty irreducible to psycho-physical aggregates. Second, the error-theoretic irrealist, believes that discourse on the self is representational in nature, but there is nothing in fact that the discourse refers to (Advaita Vedanta position). The non-factual realist irrealist (like the Upanisads), finally, does not believe our language of self is even true to its representational function.
Candrakirti, Nagarjuna and Arydeva are non-factual irrealists, in that language about the self is appropriative rather than representational, and do not describe any real entity out there in the world. Ganeri calls this the Performativist View.
Argument:
A primary argument Ganeri makes in Part I is that the philosophy/therapy that the Buddha espouses has to be taught in a manner conducive for the liberation of his listeners. One way the Buddha accomplished this aim was to teach in a protreptic, or graded, fashion. Therefore, there exist tropes of secrecy and deceit that have roots in the Upanisadic tradition, as well as parables and metaphors from the Nikaya.
Part II is based on the argument that the Buddha and the Upanisads employed different philosophical doctrines but used the same method because both presume that philosophical inquiry and the practices of truth are arts of the soul and a means to cultivating impartiality, self-control, steadiness of mind, toleration and non-violence.
Finally, Part III intends to understand what can be said of the self. He explores four views on the self. Two are realist (non-reductive realism and reductionism) and two are irrealist (error-theoretic view and the non-factualist view. The non-reductive realist is the Nyaya-Vaisesika (and the Cartesian) view, while Vasubandhu espouses the reductionist view. Of the irrealists, the Upanisads/Advaita Vedanta is the error-theoretic while the Madhyamaka is the non-factualist view point.
Method:
In Part I, Ganeri is a participant located 'inside' the texts, trying to be engaged, open and receptive to the understanding of self and world each of the texts instils.
In Part II, he examines the texts from the 'outside,' looking at them as complex and sophisticated philosophical vehicles aimed at self-transformation.
Part III, finally, is still 'outside' the text, but they are now bearers of content, rather than vehicles for transformation.
Furthermore, he argues that one must be able to adopt all these perspectives at one time if one wants to fully understand the texts. In the end, he uses the term ressourcement, as well anticipation and intratextual 'open spaces', to describe his method. Inherent in this perspective is the acknowledgement of the importance of intellectual context and authorial perspective.
Reflection:
All in all, I feel that this is an outstanding work of scholarship in which I a) began to understand the philosophical classification of the various views on self in classical Indian Philosophy and Buddhist Philosophy, b) explored the nuances of the various arguments against the self, especially in how the self relates to the skandhas and c) surprisingly, was treated to an exploration of how the self is discussed in classical Indian literature and why it is important in the first place. These three take-away points will certainly be helpful as I move forward in my study of the self.
In particular, his discussion of protreptic nature of the Buddha's teachings was illuminating. A protreptic method is one based on the idea that one teaches a subject by explaining and rejecting the various views that came before it, encouraging a listener to adopt the view of the speaker, using upon previous lessons/teachings, but in the end, coming to a more nuanced (and correct) understanding of a given subject. In other words, Ganeri says, "The term protreptic refers to a type of exhortative or admonitory discourse designed to make persons rethink their ethical beliefs and convert to a fundamental change of outlook and behavior."
The content, rather than the arguments he makes or methods he employs, is what I will primarily take away. This is stuff I have to know to be able to write intelligently about Buddhist notions of selfhood, even if I'm focusing particularly on the Buddhist self in the West.
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